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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Counter-Insurgency's Effect on the U.S. Army Field Artillery

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

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Executive Summary

Title: Counter-Insurgency's Effect on the U.S. Army Field Artillery

Author: Major Daniel C. Gibson, U.S. Army

Thesis: The Field Artillery force's proficiency in executing core competencies has degraded to the point where FA units are unable to accomplish the Field Artillery mission due to their inability to conduct major combat operations above the battery level.

Discussion:

During Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 19 to April 9, 2003, Field Artillery (FA) units fired nearly 64,000 projectiles supporting the seizure of Baghdad and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. After the transition from major combat operations to counter-insurgency operations in Iraq, the role of Field Artillery units shifted from providing close supporting indirect fires to serving as maneuver battalion headquarters, training indigenous army and police forces, providing convoy security, performing base defense, and serving as provisional infantry.

A survey conducted of FA battalion commanders from across the Army indicates several trends among the FA force. First, the overwhelming majority of FA battalions served in non-traditional roles during their last deployment and expect to do the same in their next deployment. Second, the dwell time between deployments provides too little time to train to proficiently operate at or above the battery level because of the requirement to refit from a previous deployment and prepare for an upcoming deployment. Finally, the FA force is in danger of losing the expertise required to fight above the battery level because this expertise currently resides only in battalion senior leadership; junior leaders simply do not have the opportunity achieve proficiency at that level.

A parallel can be drawn between the IDF armor forces before the Second Lebanese War and the current state of the Field Artillery. Both forces had been employed in a role outside their traditional area of expertise. After the war, however, the IDF restructured and refocused to better prepare for both COIN and MCO. This change in structure and focus led directly to the IDF's success in Operation CAST LEAD against Hamas. Similarly, the Field Artillery must refocus on doing its part to integrate into combined arms operations.

Conclusion: Because of current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Field Artillery units have lost the capacity to conduct operations at and above the battery level. The Field Artillery branch must regain its capability to operate on the right side of the spectrum of conflict while retaining the functionality gained in the years of counter-insurgency operations.

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Preface

The inspiration for this project began in 2004 after I returned to the 82d Airborne Division Artillery, where I had served as a lieutenant, after attending the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course and serving a year in the Republic of Korea. I joined the 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment in the middle of a deployment to Iraq where it was simultaneously shooting counter-fire and conducting an assortment of in-lieu-of missions including patrolling and base defense. Before this deployment, the battalion had deployed to Afghanistan where it manned 120mm mortars. I perceived then that the battalion was not as technically competent at executing traditional Field Artillery missions as a result of the varied tasks it had been executing since its deployment to Afghanistan in late 2002. Approximately 18-months after returning to Fort Bragg, North Carolina from Iraq, the battalion had achieved the proficiency that I had remembered from my earlier assignment. Since then, the battalion has deployed to Iraq twice with roughly 366 days between deployments. During those deployments, it served in a variety of roles, including provisional infantry, none of which involved providing indirect fires.

My knowledge of the battalion and its deployments coupled with correspondence with Field Artillery officers throughout the Army led me to believe that the issue in which I saw in 1-319th AFAR in 2004 might be endemic across the force. I undertook this research project in an attempt to confirm or deny my perceptions and to bring attention to the issues inherent in that degradation of capability.

There are several individuals to whom I owe gratitude for assistance that made this research project possible. Mr. Al Peterson, the Chief of Training Development and Requirements at the Directorate of Training and Doctrine Fires Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma was

one of the first people I talked to after I submitted my research proposal. He gave me valuable guidance on the direction I should take my research and guided me towards several references that eventually shaped this project. LTC Michael Patton at the Fires Center of Excellence provided assistance with distributing the survey, which proved to be the foundation of this project. Mr. Robert Liston from the Marine Corps University institutional research center built and published that web-based survey. Ms. Andrea Hamlen, the Communications Assistant from the MCU Leadership Communication Skills Center, provided valuable feedback and assistance in writing this paper. Ms. Rachel Kingcade, the Command and Staff College Reference Librarian, helped tremendously with my initial research and literature review.

I owe special thanks to the command group from 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, and specifically to my long time friend MAJ Dave Pasquale, for serving as the test population for my survey and providing valuable feedback on the survey questions. Additionally, I appreciate the assistance of all the Field Artillery battalion commanders that took time to participate in the survey.

Finally, I would like to thank my master of military studies mentor, Dr. Jerre Wilson, the Vice President for Academic Affairs for Marine Corps University, for the significant guidance, direction and advise that he provided throughout the process of completing this project.

Introduction

The Field Artillery's participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 19 March to 9 April 2003 was the unprecedented culmination of years of training and innovation that began before Operation Desert Storm. In 22 days of fighting, Field Artillery (FA) units fired nearly 64,000 projectiles supporting the seizure of Baghdad and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime.¹ Because of the transition from major combat operations (MCO) to stability and support operations (SASO) and subsequently counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, there was a shift in the role of Field Artillery units.

In support of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, FA battalions have served as maneuver battalion headquarters, trained indigenous army and police forces, provided convoy security, performed base defense, and served as provisional infantry.² This diverse set of nontraditional tasks, coupled with limited time between deployments to train on traditional artillery tasks while preparing for the next deployment, was identified as early as 2005 as having an adverse affect on the ability of FA officers to execute core competencies.³ The issue of core competency across the entire FA force received widespread recognition in the spring of 2008 when three post brigade command Army O-6s submitted a white paper to the Chief of Staff of the Army entitled: "The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery's ability to provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders." The central argument of "The King and I" is that the field artillery's culture of ruthlessly pursuing improved firing data and seamlessly integrating all fire support assets into combined arms operations has decayed to a point where it may not be recoverable.⁴

But so what? If the future of warfare is to be counter-insurgencies and counter-terrorist operations against non-state actors of the nature seen in Iraq and Afghanistan over that last seven

years, does the FA need to be as proficient in traditional Field Artillery tasks as it was prior to 2003? In his book, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is more important in influencing the outcome of battles than either technology or numerical preponderance. In fact, a significant percentage of successful antagonists on the battlefields of the 20th century have been practitioners of what Biddle terms the “modern system” of force employment. The modern system is defined by the employment of six principles: cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, suppression, and combined arms integration.⁵ More striking is that Hezbollah, Chechen fighters, Al Qaeda, and other non-state actors have practiced the principles of the modern system of force employment to varying degrees over the last two decades.⁶ Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the hybrid warfare that we see on the horizon will be a blend of irregular and conventional methods. A critical component in defeating these future hybrid threats will be the capacity to conduct traditional Field Artillery operations, built on the foundation of artillery core competencies, as part of a combined arms team.

As expressed in the Field Artillery Strategy published July 1, 2009, “the mission of the FA is to deliver and integrate lethal and non-lethal fires to enable joint and maneuver commanders to dominate their operational environment across the spectrum of conflict.”⁷ The key portion of the mission statement is the last five words: “across the spectrum of conflict.” FM 3-0 defines the spectrum of conflict as “an ascending scale of violence ranging from stable peace to general war,” with stable peace on the left side of the scale and general war on the right.⁸ For the last seven years, the FA force has been employed in non-traditional roles supporting operational themes distinctively to the left of general war along the spectrum of conflict (See Appendix A).

Seven years after the invasion of Iraq and nearly two years after the “King and I” was written, the FA force’s proficiency in executing core competencies has degraded to the point where FA units are unable to accomplish the Field Artillery mission. This degradation is manifest through the force’s inability to conduct major combat operations above the battery level. This assertion will be explored in three steps. First, this paper will discuss the role of the Field Artillery before and during major combat operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and its transition to what is seen today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Next, it will outline current trends supported by feedback from Field Artillery line battalion commanders. Finally, it will discuss the impact of these trends and compare them to Israeli Defense Force’s experience before and after the Second Lebanese War in 2006.

Transformation: From MCO to COIN :

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, prior to the commencement of major combat operations in Iraq in 2003, FA battalions spent the majority of their time training for the conventional or traditional fight where direct support FA battalions fired in support of their maneuver brigades. Generally, battery fires were commanded and controlled by the FA battalion headquarters, and as required, batteries would mass fires for battalion missions. The cycle of training for this began with section level certification for both howitzer and Fire Direction Center (FDC) sections, progressed to platoon and battery-level live fires, and often culminated with a battalion level live fire. Interspersed among these exercises, batteries and battalions often fired in support of maneuver-combined arms live fire exercises at the platoon or company level.⁹ The capstone event for a battalion was an annual rotation to one of the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) where the battalion supported its maneuver brigade in a robust force-on-force exercise. During the exercise, the FA battalion could be expected to fire all manner of fire missions

ranging from high explosive suppression missions against targets in the open to smoke missions in support of a battalion level obstacle breach to danger close destruction missions.

This model of training was a significant factor in the success of the Field Artillery and correlating success of the coalition ground forces during the major combat operations phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). However, as previously alluded to, the role of the DS FA battalion in ongoing operations overseas has changed significantly from 2003 to today. While each battalion's experience over the last seven years has been different, there are similarities between most battalions that allow for a common plane of discussion and analysis. As such, this paper will examine one battalion, 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, as a microcosm of the overall experience of the direct support FA battalion in OIF.

1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division participated in OIF I from the very beginning of ground combat operations until the collapse of the regime on April 9, 2003. In less than two years, 1-9 FA would find itself back on the ground in Iraq with a different mission. The story of 1-9 FA is indicative of the challenges undertaken by artillery battalions throughout the Army as major combat operations have transitioned to stability and support operations.

The battalion moved to firing positions on March 19, 2003 to fire as part of the Division Artillery's preparation prior to maneuver battalions crossing the line of departure. On the night of March 20, 1-9 FA began firing its portion of the preparatory fires against enemy observation posts along the Iraq-Kuwait border. The battalion fired 18 high explosive rounds at each of its assigned targets.¹⁰

After the initial crossing of the Iraqi border, 2nd BCT with 1-9 FA supporting moved north 300 miles towards Objective Rams, southeast of An Najaf. After a 35-hour march through

the desert, the battalion established firing capability along the road and began firing in support of TF 1-64 Armor's assault and 4-64 Armor's seizure of Objective Rams. Following the seizure of Objective Rams, the brigade executed limited attacks in zone to support the division's shaping efforts.¹¹

Beginning on 2 April, 2nd BCT began moving east of Karbala in an effort to bypass the city and cross the Euphrates River. After it was determined that the route was not suitable, 1-9 FA conducted a security halt along a canal road east of Karbal while the brigade reconnaissance troop found a bypass route. Unable to find a bypass, 1-64 AR followed by 1-9 FA moved through the Karbala Gap. After 20 hours on the road, 1-9 FA arrived at their attack position, refueled, and immediately began the attack across the Euphrates. Following behind 1-64 AR, the battalion occupied nonstandard firing positions west-southwest of the intersection of Highway 1 and Highway 8, known as Objective Saints, in a heavily irrigated farm area. From this position area, 1-9 FA fired 15 missions in support of the BCT's seizure of Objective Saints.¹²

After the success at Objective Saints, 2nd BCT began raiding into downtown Baghdad on 7 April. 1-9 FA fired a 16-target series shifting fires ahead of the lead maneuver battalion. 1-9 FA subsequently fired 10 counterfire missions and 24 missions against Iraqi elements bypassed during the initial assault as they attacked the BCT's lines of communication.¹³

1-9 FA's support had proven decisive in 2nd BCT's drive to Baghdad. After the end of major combat operations, they eventually redeployed home to Fort Stewart, Georgia only to return to Baghdad in January 2005. This time however, the operating environment had changed, as had the battalion's mission.¹⁴

Of note, during this period the Field Artillery School surveyed officers attending the Field Artillery Captains' Career Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma and found that significant skill

atrophy was occurring in FA officers.¹⁵ 1-9 FA's second deployment in support of OIF, from January 2005 to January 2006, occurred concurrently with this realization. The battalion's mission during this deployment is indicative of the cause of the atrophy trends identified by the Fort Sill survey.

1-9 FA was tasked to serve as a maneuver battalion in their own area of operation (AO), provide camp force protection, and provide a camp quick reaction force (QRF). In the months leading up to its deployment, the battalion re-organized and "re-optimized" to conduct counter-insurgency operations (COIN). The battalion split each of its four firing platoons into two patrol sections, one section led by the platoon leader (PL) and the other by the fire direction officer (FDO). Additionally, the battalion's survey and communications sections were consolidated to make a maneuver platoon of two patrol sections augmented by personnel from the battalion's other staff sections. The battalion's maintenance section, augmented by the mess section, formed a maneuver platoon to conduct counter-mortar/rocket patrols.¹⁶

1-9 FA began training to its ad hoc structure at Fort Stewart. This training continued during its Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. It culminated with the battalion's arrival into theater and subsequent relief in place of a mechanized infantry battalion.

While simultaneously training the firing platoons and specialty staff sections to operate in their newfound roles as maneuver sections, the battalion staff trained to operate as a maneuver battalion headquarters. In addition to learning to employ enablers such as tactical psychological operations and civil affairs teams, traditional FA staff sections were re-optimized to execute civil affairs, information operations, and force protection while refocusing from artillery oriented operations and intelligence functions to COIN maneuver operations and intelligence functions.

1-9 Field Artillery's change in mission between its first deployment to OIF and its subsequent deployment less than two years later is a microcosm of the experience of the direct support FA battalion in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While conducting operations in and around Baghdad from January 2005 to January 2006, 1-9 FA proved to be a successful model for re-optimization of a FA battalion to serve in a COIN role. In twelve months of operations, the battalion killed or captured more than 150 insurgents, seized hundreds of weapons, and found and destroyed tons of ammunition and explosives in weapons caches.¹⁷ 1-9 FA's success, as well as that of many other artillery battalions, would mean that the Field Artillery would continue to be employed in non-traditional roles. In Afghanistan, this situation is complicated by the fact that battalions are serving as maneuver headquarters. Simultaneously, some firing platoons and special staff sections are re-optimized to serve as maneuver platoons and patrol sections, while other firing platoons are scattered across the battlespace providing indirect fires in support of maneuver battalions.¹⁸

Survey Methodology

The example of 1-9 Field Artillery supports the assumption that core competency proficiency has continued to degrade as battalions conduct multiple deployments serving in non-traditional roles. To validate this assumption, FA battalion commanders from across the Army participated in a web-based survey tailored to provide a comparison between the type and amount of training battalions currently receive versus what was conducted before OIF I. The survey included questions concerning dwell time between deployments,¹⁹ the battalion's role during deployments, and the type and quality of training between deployments (see Appendix B for list of survey questions). Eighteen line FA battalion commanders participated in the survey, representing 30% of the total FA line battalion commander population.²⁰ The survey

respondents cover the M119, M109A6 Paladin, and the M270 series Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) communities. One-third of the sample population came from the M119 community, while MLRS and Paladin respondents each represented 28% of the sample population. The remaining 11% of the sample population came from the M777 and M198 communities. While the breadth and size of the results sample does not meet the rigid requirements for statistical significance, it does suffice to indicate potential trends.

Trends: The Current State of the Field Artillery

The survey results, corroborated by the experience of 1-9 FA, indicate that the overwhelming majority of FA battalions are deploying and serving in roles other than what is described as traditional Field Artillery roles. Two-thirds of the respondents reported serving in a non-traditional role during the battalion's last deployment (Figure C-3). These roles include, but are not limited to, serving as maneuver battalions, military police units, foreign internal defense, and fixed site force protection. The number of respondents describing their role in *upcoming* deployments as non-traditional decreased to 39%. Presumably, this is as a result of increasing numbers of FA battalions deploying to Afghanistan where firing platoons are scattered across the battlespace in firebases providing indirect fire support for dismounted operations. Twenty-eight percent of the sample reported serving in some form of a traditional Field Artillery role on the battalion's last deployment. One-third reported that they anticipated they would serve in a Field Artillery role on an upcoming deployment. Both of these statistics include battalions where the battalion headquarters (HQs) serves as maneuver task forces HQs while some percentage of firing platoons provide indirect fire support.

In the aggregate, the average dwell time between deployments is 14 to 24 months. There is not a significant difference in the average dwell time between the communities—M119,

Paladin, and MLRS—or between each community and the aggregate. As a result of the employment role of FA battalions during deployments, the survey data shows that battalions are splitting the dwell time training for both traditional and non-traditional roles. The effect is that the training for the traditional role is generally occurring at the lower echelons, that is, platoon and section. Indicative of this, half of the respondents reported that the platoon level was the highest echelon to which the battalion has trained—or will train—to mass fires. 22% reported training to mass at the battery level, and another 22% reported training to mass at the battalion level (Figure C-4). Interestingly, of the 22% of the respondents that reported massing fires at the battalion level, one caveated his response by saying, “We did Mass Fires at the Battalion, but did not have the time to go further than [platoon live fire qualification]. And in [platoon live fire qualification] I purposely removed the Time Standards because I wanted folks focused on accuracy and crew drill and not cutting corners to speed the delivery.”²¹

Given the split training focus at homestation and the limited traditional artillery training that can be accomplished during overseas deployments, respondents reported that their battalions would require an average of nearly four months²² of training with no detractors to achieve a fully trained status in traditional Field Artillery mission essential tasks. Looking at the data by specific weapon systems, the response from both the M119 and MLRS respondents was between three and four months, averaging 3.2 and 3.6 months for M119 and MLRS respondents respectively. Paladin respondents reported requiring nearly six months to achieve the same level of proficiency. Presumably, this is due in part because M119 battalions deploy to Afghanistan, where some firing platoons provide indirect fires in support of maneuver battalions. Paladin battalions, on the other hand, have habitually deployed only to Iraq where there has been less of a requirement for platoons to provide an indirect firing capability.²³

Only one-third of the respondents provided a response about the quality and type of training during recent CTC rotations compared to rotations before OIF I (Appendix A, question # 17). While the number of responses was not large enough to extrapolate a conclusion about the type of training at CTCs across the force, the similarity between the responses is striking. While some of the respondents allude to traditional artillery training that occurred before or during the rotation, all the responses stated that the focus of the training was on non-traditional COIN tasks.

Perhaps, the most striking set of responses on the entire survey are those to the final question: how would you compare the proficiency of your battalion today to execute traditional FA tasks to your unit before May 2003 (Appendix B, question # 18). Two-thirds (67%) responded that their battalions were significantly less proficient at traditional tasks compared to before OIF I. The majority of the negative responses came from Paladin and MLRS respondents. Interestingly, half of the M119 respondents reported that they are at a comparable level of proficiency at the battery level and below. Presumably, this is again a product of M119 battalions' deployments to Afghanistan and the nature of the missions assigned there. As opposed to the M119 statistics, 100% of the responses for Paladin respondents reported a severe degradation in proficiency. Two of the responses from the Paladin community are worth quoting verbatim. Both quotes are from direct support (DS) Paladin battalions whose most recent deployments required them to function as maneuver battalions. The first stated, "The FDC's require complete reset and retraining, beginning with the fire direction fundamentals." The second states, "[senior] leaders have the majority of the experience with regards to traditional FA tasks," which he defines as "massing, counter-fire, special munitions, and special situations." These two ideas that have significant implications on the ability of FA units to accomplish the Field Artillery mission.

Implications for the Future

What is most evident from this data is that the Field Artillery has lost the proficiency to operate in the capacity as it did in OIF I and before. The effect of a 12 to 15 month deployment where a battalion operates in a non-traditional role while conducting minimal training on traditional tasks due to operational requirements is compounded by the fact that homestation training time must be divided between preparing for a known deployment and training traditional artillery tasks. Currently, it would take between three and six months of uninhibited training to bring the average battalion up to a fully trained status on traditional collective tasks. Of the three system communities assessed in the survey—M119, Paladin, and MLRS—the Paladin community has seen the greatest proficiency degradation in core competencies. The marked lack of proficiency of Paladin battalions is most disturbing given that Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) supported by Paladin battalions bore the brunt of the Army's load during OIF I. While the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the 2nd BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division did make significant contributions, it was the three HBCTs of the 3rd Infantry Division that traveled the farthest, seized the most terrain, and subsequently took Baghdad.

Certainly, this is not the first time that FA units and field artillerymen have served in non-traditional roles during overseas operations. As Dr. Larry Yates describes in his Global War on Terrorism Paper, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience*, field artillerymen have eagerly undertaken a variety of roles and tasks to support mission accomplishment going as far back as the Indian Wars in the first half of the 19th Century. In fact, current operations undertaken by field artillerymen in Afghanistan are very similar to those conducted in Vietnam. Artillery batteries and platoons provided indirect fire support to maneuver battalions from fire support bases scattered throughout South Vietnam.²⁴ Also, similar

to current operations in Afghanistan, artillerymen in Vietnam often served as provisional infantry or in a litany of other roles when their expertise as artillerymen were not required.

While the manner in which artillery units are being employed in Afghanistan is not necessarily new, the significant differences between current FA force employment and that in previous operations are the scope and the duration. Some battalions were deployed to Vietnam supporting COIN operations. Other battalions were forward deployed to Europe and Korea to deter the communist threat in those locations. Those forces were focused on training artillerymen for a more traditional fight against the Soviets and the North Koreans respectively. Today however, of the battalions not currently deployed overseas, all have a reasonable expectation to be deployed in support of ongoing operations within the next 14 to 24 months. As such, the Field Artillery is experiencing a universal skill atrophy that was not seen during or immediately following Vietnam. Additionally, the US Army's major commitment in Vietnam lasted eight years, from 1965 to 1973 when the last of the Army's conventional combat forces departed.²⁵ Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have been ongoing for an equal amount of time, however without a definitive end in sight.

Despite this, current operations in Afghanistan, where M119 platoons and batteries are providing traditional indirect fires in support of ground maneuver forces, albeit at an echelon lower than what would be considered traditional, allow for the maintenance of technical and tactical skills at the platoon and section level. Paladin battalions, on the other hand, have shown to have a more significant degradation in proficiency.

Analyzing this proficiency at the individual level, field artillerymen who have entered the Army since May 2003 have been most impacted by the requirement to cycle between traditional tasks and COIN specific tasks. In *Factors That Influence Skill Decay and Retention: A*

Quantitative Review and Analysis, the article's authors suggest that overtraining or overlearning has a significant effect on an individual's ability to retain skill proficiency after duration of nonuse or non-practice. The authors define overlearning as "additional training beyond that required for initial proficiency," and suggest that it "gives the trainee more confidence in his or her performance and decreases factors (e.g., stress and anxiety) that hamper performance during retention tests."²⁶ Applying this concept to a FA battery or platoon, artillerymen serving prior to May 2003 could be considered to have had a great deal of overlearning because units generally only trained to execute traditional artillery tasks. In fact, the overlearning increased as enlisted Soldiers increased in rank due to the requirement that they not only train on the tasks that are required, but they train their subordinates on the tasks. While this concept is most applicable to enlisted Soldiers, it is applicable, to a certain extent, to officers as well. Officers who rose in duty positions from fire direction officer to platoon leader or executive officer would experience some degree of overlearning in each duty position which would increase as the officer trained others to perform his tasks. This evolution would continue as officers that had previously served as FDOs, PLs, and XO's rose in rank and became assigned as battery commanders where they would be responsible for training the battery's officers.

Today, with the current rate of deployments, there are significantly fewer opportunities for overlearning than before May 2003. An officer that reports to a BCT immediately after completion of basic officer training typically has less than 36 months on station prior to promotion to captain.²⁷ With a homestation dwell time of 14-24 months, it is likely that an officer will experience two deployments within the 36-month window from arriving on station to pinning on captain. Statistically, it is reasonable to assume that the officer's battalion will be serving in a non-traditional role during both deployments. Subtracting post deployment refit

time and predeployment specific training, that leaves a maximum of 18 months where the battalion could potentially focus on training traditional artillery tasks. Over that 18-month period, the officer would likely serve in two duty positions. The result is that a junior company grade officer can at best expect one 12-month tour as either a fire support officer, fire direction officer, platoon leader, or executive officer conducting traditional artillery operations. The results of the survey suggests that this is possibly ambitious given that on average the respondents reported that only 50% of their battery commanders had traditional experience as a fire support officer, fire direction officer, platoon leader, or executive officer.

Further, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the deployments and dwell time are having a similar effect on junior enlisted and non-commissioned officers as is occurring with officers. The amount of training time that battalions typically dedicate to traditional tasks is adequate to achieve initial proficiency but inadequate to achieve a level of overtraining that allows a level of skill proficiency to endure a 12-month period of non-practice. As such, once battalions return from deployment, they are essentially beginning from scratch at training traditional artillery tasks. On a positive note, providing that dwell times do not decrease below current levels, individual proficiency will not get any worse for enlisted Soldiers. Enlisted Soldier proficiency could get better as more battalions deploy to Afghanistan, providing that a requirement for decentralized platoons to provide indirect fire support continues.

On the other hand, FA officer technical proficiency will continue to decline. Already in a position where an average of 50% of battery commanders do not have prior traditional experience as an FSO, FDO, PL, or XO, future battery commanders' experience in those duties will be as decentralized platoons operating from stationary fire bases. Given that less than half of the respondents reported training to mass fires at the battery level or above, it can be inferred

that the technical expertise in massing above the battery level, shooting special munitions and missions, and conducting battery and battalion tactical movements currently resides only in the senior leadership within a battalion. Continuation of the current trend will eradicate this expertise at the battalion level as the current battalion senior leadership is promoted.

In the Second Lebanese War during the summer of 2006, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) found themselves in a situation comparable to the current state of the Field Artillery with respect to traditional training and proficiency. Following the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the IDF had focused almost exclusively on conducting COIN operations in Gaza and the West Bank. Dismounted patrols, cordon and search missions, and raids at the company and platoon level characterized these operations, which were carried out by not only infantrymen, but by dismounted armor troops as well.²⁸ Thus, going into the summer of 2006, a “COIN state of mind” was prevalent within the IDF that dictated that the force did not need to prepare to conduct MCO as IDF leadership believed that they would only conduct COIN operations in the foreseeable future.²⁹ In conjunction with this mindset, the loss of MCO proficiency was compounded by budget cuts that limited the amount of training IDF units were able to conduct when not actively executing operations in Gaza or the West Bank.³⁰

When major ground operations began against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the effect of the failure to train for MCO became readily apparent. IDF units suffered several tactical defeats to Hezbollah fighters that fought more like a conventional army than a guerrilla force. Notably, at the Battle of Bint Jbeil on 26 July 2006, Hezbollah conducted a deliberate combined arms defense that prevented three Israeli brigades from seizing the town.³¹ Similarly, at the Battle of Wadi al-Saluki elements of an Israeli armored brigade mounted on Merkava 4s—arguably the most modern main battle tank in the world—were butchered by a Hezbollah

combined arms ambush. The Israeli forces failed to execute basic react to enemy contact battle drills such as employing the vehicles' smoke generation systems to screen the force from incoming anti-tank missiles and to coordinate the response of infantry and armor elements. Additionally, Israeli Northern Command denied the on scene commander's calls for artillery and close air support. Essentially, the higher headquarters lacked confidence in the element in contact to the extent that it feared the fires would result in fratricide rather than relieving the unit in contact.³² The fight at Wadi al-Saluki highlighted the degradation of the IDF, both in the decline of tactical proficiency of the force and in the leadership's realization of the decline.

A parallel can be drawn between the IDF armor forces before the Second Lebanese War and the current state of the field artillery. Both forces had been employed in a role outside their traditional area of expertise: dismounted patrols, cordon and search missions, and small unit raids. Both elements had limited opportunity to train for their traditional MCO role. IDF armor forces due to lack of funding, Field Artillery due to limited time between overseas deployments. Given those two similarities, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that if the Field Artillery were thrown into MCO in its current state, FA units would encounter similar problems to those encountered by the IDF armor forces at Wadi al-Saluki.

Additionally, this validates Stephen Biddle's assertion that the character of war has changed less over the last 100 years than is often believed.³³ Hezbollah's implementation of principles of the modern system of force employment, particularly small unit independent maneuver and combined arms integration which have been the hallmark of successful armies since the German offensive in 1918, shows that the future may be more similar to the past than many realize.³⁴

After the Second Lebanese War, the IDF restructured and refocused to better prepare for both COIN and MCO. It changed its training program and updated doctrine and tactics to emphasize offensive operations and combined arms maneuver. The IDF implemented realistic combined arms live fires as well as command post exercises ranging from battalion to division level. These exercises de-emphasized the decentralized mindset prevalent in COIN in Gaza and the West Bank stemming from the predominance of company and platoon operations.³⁵

In early 2009, the IDF began Operation CAST LEAD to disrupt Hamas in Gaza. CAST LEAD was a return to traditional Israel offensive operations because of the shift in focus in the intervening period after the Second Lebanese War. The basic fighting formation of CAST LEAD was the brigade, with several key enablers aligned with each maneuver brigade. In a manner similar to the U.S. Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) construct, brigade commanders implemented close air support and rotary wing attack aviation in close coordination with artillery fires to accompany maneuver, preempt ambushes, and drive Hamas fighters from prepared positions to enable their destruction.³⁶

Significant for the IDF, they had more than a two-year period from August 2006 to December 2008 where the force was not committed to conducting sustained combat operations to address the issues identified fighting Hezbollah. Continuing the parallel between the IDF and the Field Artillery, the Field Artillery must refocus on doing its part to integrate into combined arms operations.

Recommendations

Advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs could argue that the development and proliferation of cannon artillery precision-guided munitions (PGM) will reduce the requirement for Field Artillery forces. This argument is underpinned by the idea that PGMs would reduce the

number of munitions required to achieve effects thus reducing the number of trained artillerymen required to fire them. This would allow those artillerymen to be assigned to other missions besides manning their weapon systems. While initially plausible, there are two issues with this argument. The first is cost. Precision-guided munitions are expensive. Because of their cost, it is likely that there will not be enough available on the gunline to service the number of targets required by a ground force commander during major combat operations. A derivative effect of this will be that the munitions will be hoarded by upper level commanders and saved for high value targets to facilitate operational objectives. This leaves a gap for company and battalion commanders that require only suppression to facilitate the seizure of their tactical objectives.

The second problem is explained by the old artillery school adage of “garbage in equals garbage out.” A forward observer in a troops-in-contact situation may not have time or the capability to determine a precise target location. Without precision target location, an artillery delivered PGM is nothing more than a very expensive area fire weapon.

Despite the issues preventing artillery delivered PGMs from becoming the only munitions in a FA battalion’s basic load, the technology must be pursued and proliferated throughout the force so that the firing units gain competence and the supported maneuver commanders gain confidence in their employment. Additionally, there must be an improvement in the technology available to the individual forward observer. Forward observers require a hand held device to self-generate category II coordinates³⁷ and to provide laser terminal guidance to efficiently employ current and future artillery delivered PGMs.

The increased availability of cannon artillery PGMs as well as lightweight, hand held devices to accurately determine target location would broaden the applicability of cannon artillery fires in the current operating environment. Similarly, MAJ Richard Scott makes a

compelling argument for non-lethal cannon artillery munitions in his article “Full-Spectrum Artillery,” in the January-February 2010 issue of *Fires*. Convincingly, Scott points out that “incorporat[ing] a more robust (lethal and nonlethal) arsenal into the scheme of fires, branch marginalization will cease and maintaining core proficiencies and preventing skill set atrophy will become little more than training objectives.”³⁸

However, new and innovative technology alone will not resolve the issue. A more fitting resolution would be what the IDF found in the intervening years between the Second Lebanese War and Operation CAST LEAD: going back to the fundamentals that made the IDF a deterrent force in the Middle East. Similarly, the Field Artillery needs a back to basics approach to redress the skill atrophy without completely shelving the lessons and experience of the last eight years.

Many battalions are already doing this with their post deployment training plans and are being assisted by resident experts from the Fires Center of Excellence by way of reset mobile training teams. However, the bulk of this training has focused at the platoon level and below. This leaves a large skill set void at the battery level and above. In order to fill this gap the Combat Training Centers (CTC) should revamp rotations so that player units are actually doing Full Spectrum Operations. The CTCs have traditionally provided the culminating training event for units by facilitating challenging and realistic scenarios that stretch player units’ capabilities to the limit. CTC scenarios should be upgraded to challenge units to truly perform the complete range of full spectrum operations. FA units particularly should be challenged to support offensive and defensive operations through performing traditional artillery roles and then transition to non-traditional roles to support stability and civil-support operations.

Conclusion

The first priority of the Field Artillery and the Army must be to win the wars that we are currently fighting. However, preparing for the next war while we continue to engage in Iraq and in Afghanistan must have a similar priority to avoid a debacle similar to that which the Israeli Defense Forces experienced at the hands of Hezbollah in the Second Lebanese War of 2006.

Given that example, the potential cost of continuing to be a solely COIN focused force is readily apparent. FA force's core competency degradation as a result of sustained deployments in non-traditional roles places the force in a situation similar to the IDF prior to the Second Lebanese War. The challenge is to convince the force of the need to re-train so called "legacy tasks," such as massing above the battery level or firing special munitions. Indicative of this is one of the responses to the final survey question that asked to compare their battalion's current proficiency at traditional tasks with the battalion's proficiency prior to May 2003. One battalion commander responded, "I do not believe [the Full Spectrum Operations] requires traditional mass [field artillery] fires. My battalion will be very proficient at providing the type of fires required for [Full Spectrum Operations] in OEF." This statement underscores what Brigadier General (ret.) Shimon Naveh of the IDF said during an interview with Matt Matthews speaking of the IDF's operations in Gaza and the West Bank from 2000-2006:

The point is that the IDF fell in love with what it was doing with the Palestinians. In fact, it became addictive. When you fight a war against a rival who's by all means inferior to you, you may lose a guy here or there, but you're in total control. It's nice. You can pretend that you fight the war and yet it's not really a dangerous war. This kind of thing served as an instrument corrupting the IDF.³⁹

The U.S. Army in general, and the Field Artillery specifically, are in danger of becoming addicted to the last war. An example of this is the survey response quoted above. Interestingly, the respondent states that his battalion is capable of "providing the type of fires required for [Full Spectrum Operations] in OEF." Although at times strikingly kinetic, operations in Afghanistan

fall somewhat short of major combat operations, which is an operational theme on the spectrum of conflict. Full Spectrum Operations is the operational concept currently in vogue to prepare for the spectrum of conflict. FM 3-0, *Operations*, states that Full Spectrum Operations “is flexible enough to apply in any situation worldwide.”⁴⁰ As such, to imply that Full Spectrum Operations does not require massing fires above the battalion level is a misinterpretation of the doctrine.

Today, the Field Artillery is not being asked to execute the full gamut of its mission. However, if fighting Chechnya, Rwanda, the Second Lebanese War, and the 2008 South Ossetia War⁴¹ are any indication, it will. In the era of persistent conflict, the Field Artillery branch must regain its capability to operate on the right side of the spectrum of conflict while retaining the functionality gained in the years of counter-insurgency operations.

¹ William G. Pitts, "Overview: Field Artillery in Operation Iraqi Freedom." *Field Artillery* no. 5, Sep/Oct, 2003, 2-3, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=515750731&Fmt=7&clientId=32176&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed January 20, 2010).

² Loyd A. Gerber, "RESET - Rebuilding FA Core Competencies for Future Full-Spectrum Operations." *FA Journal*, March 1, 2007, 14, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 20, 2010).

³ Gerber, 15.

⁴ Sean MacFarland, Michael Shields, and Jeffrey Snow, "The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery's ability to provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders," (White Paper), 3.

⁵ Stephen D. Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 35.

⁶ Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), xvi-xvii.

⁷ Ross E. Ridge, "The Field Artillery Strategy." *Fires*, September 1, 2009, 2, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed February 20, 2010).

⁸ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, February 2008), 2-1. The first paragraph of page 2-1 states "The spectrum of conflict is an ascending scale of violence ranging from stable peace to general war. Operational themes give commanders a way to characterize the dominant major operation

underway in an area of operations. The themes also provide overlapping categories for grouping types of operations from the land force perspective."

⁹ Jeffrey Noll, "The Battle Of As Samawah: Fire Support in the Urban Fight."

Infantry, November 1, 2005, 39-40, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed January 3, 2010).

¹⁰ Phillip D. Rice, "Decisive Fires, Decisive Victory: 1-9 FA in OIF," *Field Artillery*, Issue 5, (SEP/OCT 2003).

¹¹ Rice, 3.

¹² Rice, 4-5.

¹³ Rice, 5.

¹⁴ Steven M. Merkel and John G. Clement, "Battlekings: Return to Baghdad as a Maneuver Battalion: Doing More with Less." *FA Journal*, Jul/Aug, 2006, 22, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1173341001&Fmt=7&clientId=32176&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁵ Gerber, 15.

¹⁶ Merkel and Clement, 1-2.

¹⁷ Merkel and Clement, 5.

¹⁸ Bertrand A. Ges, "3-319 AFAR TF Gun Devils: Providing FA Fires for Afghanistan and Maneuvering on the Enemy." *FA Journal*, Sep/Oct, 2006, 20, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1178653551&Fmt=7&clientId=32176&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

¹⁹ The survey was distributed on November 20, 2009, two weeks before the President of the United States announced the surge in forces to Afghanistan. Therefore, it is possible that there are inaccuracies in the dwell time data, particularly in the M119 data, due to units receiving deployment orders after the survey was completed.

²⁰ Only battalion commanders of FORSCOM field artillery battalions were asked to participate in the survey. Of the 60 field artillery battalion in FORSCOM, responses were received from 18 battalion commanders, fully 30% of the surveyed population. Responses from TRADOC field artillery battalion commanders would not be relevant to this study.

²¹ Respondent's reply to question #12 of survey designed and distributed by Major Daniel C. Gibson, the author.

²² The aggregate average of all the respondents was 3.898 months.

²³ In late 2008 there were no more than 8 howitzers in the northern half of Iraq, from Baghdad to Mosul, that could be considered in position and ready to fire at any one time. During this time, there were at least 5 artillery battalions deployed to the area.

²⁴ Larry Yates, *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other than War: An Overview of the US Experience*. The Long War Occasional Paper Series. Occasional Paper 4 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 25, http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/GWOT_4.pdf (accessed 30 December 2009).

²⁵ Yates, 28.

²⁶ Winfred Arthur Jr., Winston Bennett Jr., Pamela L. Stanush, and Theresa L. McNelly. 1998. "Factors That Influence Skill Decay and Retention: A Quantitative Review and Analysis." *Human Performance* 11, no. 1 (1998): 57, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed December 22, 2009), 59-60.

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- ²⁷ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Officers Promotions*, Army Regulation 600-8-29 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, February 2005), 3.
- ²⁸ Abe F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, ed. Scott C. Farquhar (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2009), 84-85.
- ²⁹ Shimon Naveh, "Interview with BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh," by Matt M. Matthews, *Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 2007), 9, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mattmatthews.pdf> (accessed 30 December 2009).
- ³⁰ Marrero, 84-85.
- ³¹ Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*. The Long War Occasional Paper Series. Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 45-47, <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/matthewsOP26.pdf> (accessed 30 December 2009).
- ³² Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared*, 54-55.
- ³³ Biddle, *Military Power*, ix.
- ³⁴ Biddle and Friedman, 77.
- ³⁵ Marrero, 87-89.
- ³⁶ Marrero, 92-94.
- ³⁷ United States Department of Defense. *Close Air Support*. Joint Publication 3-09.3, July 8, 2009, V-4. Table V-2 on page V-4 defines Category II coordinates as coordinates with a target location error having a circular error probability between 21-50 feet.
- ³⁸ Richard L. Scott, "Full-Spectrum Artillery." *Fires* (Jan/Feb, 2010): 39, http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2010/Jan_Feb_2010/Pages_36_37.pdf.
- ³⁹ Shimon Naveh, 9.
- ⁴⁰ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Operations*, 3-1.
- ⁴¹ Biddle and Friedman, 78.

Appendix A




Figure 2-2. The spectrum of conflict and operational themes

Source: Headquarters Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, February 2008), 218.

Appendix B: Survey Questions

1	What is your current duty position?
2	What system is your BN equipped with?
3	Is your battalion DS or GS?
4	Where is your battalion in the ARFORGEN process?
5	Is your battalion CMETL or DMETL focused?
6	How long ago did your battalion return from its last deployment?
7	What type of mission(s) did your battalion conduct during its last deployment?
8	When is your battalion scheduled to deploy again?
9	What type of mission(s) will your battalion be conducting on its upcoming deployment?
10	Since your battalion's last deployment and before the next, what is the largest element that has trained or will train to mass fires?
11	What percentage of your battalion's training time has been or will be spent training traditional artillery tasks vs. non-traditional tasks?
12	With no detractors, how much time would be required to train your battalion to 100% proficiency in traditional artillery mission essential tasks?
13	Of the three core FA LT duty positions (FSO, FDO, and XO/Firing PL), what percentage of your junior officers have (or will have) more than 6 months of experience in more than one duty position prior to being promoted to Captain? (if you do not know leave blank)
14	What percentage of your junior officers will be released from active duty in lieu of attending a Captain's Career Course? (if you do not know leave blank)
15	Of your current battery commanders, what percentage have traditional experience as an FSO, FDO, or XO/Firing PL? (if you do not know leave blank)
16	When was your most recent Mission Readiness Exercise? Where – CMTC/JRMC, NTC, JRTC, Homestation? (if you do not know leave blank)
17	With respect to field artillery training, how was your experience in this most recent CTC rotation different from your CTC experience before May 2003? (if you do not know leave blank)
18	How would you compare the proficiency of your battalion today to execute traditional FA tasks to your unit before May 2003?

What system is your BN equipped with?





Figure C-1

Is your battalion DS or GS?



What type of mission(s) did/will your battalion conduct during its last/next deployment?




Figure C-3

Since your battalion's last deployment and before the next, what is the largest element that has trained or will train to mass fires?




Figure C-4

Appendix D: Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

AO	Area of Operations
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
Category II Coordinates	Target location error with a circular error probability between 21-50 feet
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CTC	Combat Training Center
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. Renamed the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in December 2005.
DS	Direct Support
FA	Field Artillery
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FDO	Fire Direction Officer
FSO	1) Fire Support Officer 2) Full Spectrum Operations
GS	General Support
HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
HQs	Headquarters
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
JRMC	Joint Multinational Readiness Center; know as the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) until December 2005; located in Hohenfels, Germany
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center; Fort Polk, LA
M109A6	155mm medium self propelled medium howitzer; know as Paladin
M119	105mm towed light howitzer

M198	155mm towed medium howitzer
M777	155mm ultra-lightweight towed medium howitzer
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MCO	Major Combat Operations
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MRE	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
NTC	National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
Paladin	M109A6 155mm medium self propelled medium howitzer
PGM	Precision Guided Munitions
PL	Platoon Leader
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SASO	Stability And Support Operations
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
XO	Executive Officer

Raw Survey Results (1 of 4)

What is your current duty position?	What system is your BN equipped with?	Is your battalion DS or GS? Where is your battalion in the ARFORGEN process?	Is your battalion CMETL or DMETL focused?	How long ago did your battalion return from its last deployment?	What type of mission(s) did your battalion conduct during its last deployment?	When is your battalion scheduled to deploy again?	What type of mission(s) will your battalion be conducting on its upcoming deployment?	Since your battalion's last deployment and before the next, what is the largest element that has trained or will train to mass fires?
BN Cdr	M119	DS Just returned from OIF deployment two weeks ago. Executing reintegration tasks now, and begin block leave on 12 December.	CMETL	Less than 6 months	MVR BN	Not currently scheduled to deploy	Don't know at this time, but	BN
BN Cdr	M119	DS Training	DMETL	7 - 12 months	MVR BN	Not currently scheduled to deploy	MVR BN	PLT
BN Cdr	M119	DS Training ready In reference to 2. we are no longer DS we are the organic Fires BN for an IBCT	CMETL	7 - 12 months	MVR BN In reference to #4 CMETL is going away. We are training to one METL that includes MVR Tasks, might change a bite after PDSS (more or less MVR and Fires depending on mission) but not much.	7 - 12 months	Both Fires and MVR	PLT
BN Cdr	M119	DS Deployed	DMETL	13 - 18 months	Both, maneuver, fires, and security role	Currently deployed	Both maneuver and Fires, along with providing synchronization of lethal and non lethal fires for the BCT.	PLT
BN Cdr	M119	DS deployed	DMETL	Currently Deployed	Tradional FA Role Also serving as a maneuver TF with attached IN companies	13 - 18 months	Tradional FA Role	PLT
BN Cdr	M119	DS DEPLOYED (OIF)	DMETL	Currently Deployed	MVR BN	Currently deployed	MVR BN	PLT

Table E-1

Raw Survey Results (2 of 4)

What is your current duty position?	What system is your BN equipped with?	Is your battalion DS or GS? Where is your battalion in the ARFORGEN process?	Is your battalion CMETL or DMETL focused?	How long ago did your battalion return from its last deployment?	What type of mission(s) did your battalion conduct during its last deployment?	When is your battalion scheduled to deploy again?	What type of mission(s) will your battalion be conducting on its upcoming deployment?	Since your battalion's last deployment and before the next, what is the largest element that has trained or will train to mass fires?
BN Cdr	M198	GS Deployed	DMETL	More than 25 months	MVR BN	Currently deployed	MVR BN	BTRY
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS Forward Deployed	DMETL	Currently Deployed	Traditional FA Role	Currently deployed	Traditional FA Role	BN
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS Reset	CMETL	Less than 6 months		Not currently scheduled to deploy		Haven't massed fires
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS Reset	CMETL	Less than 6 months	MVR BN	13 - 18 months	Traditional FA Role	BN
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS Just returned from deployment. Have begun Artillery Reset trng.	CMETL	Less than 6 months	Deployed to Horn of Africa. Executed foreign military trng, force protection for civil-military projects, Joint Combat Search and Rescue and camp security	Not currently scheduled to deploy	unknown	BTRY
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS RESET	CMETL	Less than 6 months	MP Mission	Not currently scheduled	Traditional FA Role	PLT
BN Cdr	M777	GS 2 x Firing Batteries and 1 x ILO TAB Deploying in 2 months	DMETL	13 - 18 months	Traditional FA Role	Less than 6 months	Traditional FA Role	Our forward Support Company will execute an ILO TAB mission (4 x FF Radars)
BN Cdr	Paladin	GS 2 x Btry in Reset 1 x Btry in Train/Ready	DMETL	Less than 6 months	2 firing batteries were deployed as TABs with Q36 radars providing EAD counterfire support in OIF.	Less than 6 months		1 Firing Battery will deploy as a TAB with 15 Q36 radars providing EAD Counterfire support in OIF.
BN Cdr	Paladin	DS Deploy/Ready	DMETL		My Battalion was activated new at Fort Bliss	Currently deployed		BN
BN Cdr	Paladin	DS Deployed in support of OIF 09-11	DMETL	13 - 18 months	MVR BN	Currently deployed	MVR BN	BTRY
BN Cdr	Paladin	DS Finishing - PTDO within 9 months	DMETL	7 - 12 months	MVR BN	7 - 12 months		Trainer - ANA & ANP
BN Cdr	M777	DS pre-MRE training	CMETL	7 - 12 months	BDOC at Camp Tajl	7 - 12 months	MVR BN	Unknown, but not FA. Deploying to OIF as part of SBCT-A

Table E-2

Raw Survey Results (3 of 4)

What is your current duty position?		What system is your BN equipped with?		Is your battalion DS or G&S?		What percentage of your battalion's training time has been or will be spent on traditional artillery tasks?		With no detractors, how much time would be required to train your battalion to 100% proficiency in traditional artillery mission essential tasks?		Of the three core FA LT duty positions (FSO, FDO, and XO/Firing PLT), what percentage of your junior officers have experience in more than one duty position prior to being promoted to Captain?		What percentage of your junior officers will be released from active duty in less than 6 months of attaining a Captain's Career Contract?		Of your current battery commanders, what percentage have traditional XO/Firing PLT experience?		When was your most recent Mission Readiness Exercise? Where?		With respect to field artillery training, how was your experience in this most recent CTC rotation different from your CTC experience before May 2003? (If you do not know leave blank)		How would you compare the proficiency of your battalion today to its proficiency in traditional FA tasks to your unit before May 2003?	
BN Cdr	M119	DS	The plan is to train 100% traditional METL	4	3%	5%	1	JRTC in July/August 2008	We did no artillery training at our MRE due to the mission we were to assume	Much less proficient. We spent about two months training Artillery tasks in 2008 before focusing solely on our DMETL tasks. While deployed, we rotated platoons through an Artillery "Training Academy", IOT reestablish some fundamental skills. This however, does not get us anywhere close to the skills that were commonplace prior to GWOT requirements, and when there was a Force FA HQ's conducting external evaluations of Artillery BNs.											
BN Cdr	M119	DS	75-25	0.75	63%	18%	1	Coming up in Feb 10		My Battalion has spent most of the past 8 months on core artillery tasks. We have conducted gunners tests and section certs twice. We've conducted numerous FDXs and fired over 14,000 rounds. Most of that training has been focused at Battery and below. Compared to 2003 we are on par or ahead at Battery and below. As far as massing and fighting the BN in FA tasks we are behind											
BN Cdr	M119	DS	180%	1.16	50%		0.5	CMTIC, Bamberg	Trained in both a MVR and Fires role	Not really a fair question because I do not believe FSO requires traditional MASS FA fires. My BN will be very proficient at providing the type of fires required for FSO operations in OEF. Not sure a traditional FA BN could have supported it any better											
BN Cdr	M119	DS	70	2.25		90	0.1	JMRC Aug-Sep 09	Trained												
BN Cdr	M119	DS	90%	6	100%		0	11/08/2010		Shoot is the same. Move is degraded											
BN Cdr	M119	DS	10%	5	30%	5%	0.33	APR-MAY 09 - JRTC	JRTC was extremely flexible in focusing training tasks and assessments on my and the BCT CDR's training objectives. While most of my formation was focused on a DMETL maneuver mission, I had 1 x PLT organized and employed as a traditional firing unit. They safely and accurately fired over 2,500 rounds during the LFX and conducted split platoon close supporting fires during the FOF portion.	Cannot be compared equally. Due to operational necessities in OIF and OEF, the unit has focused predominantly on MVR BN tasks in which they have become extremely proficient. Core Artillery competencies have deteriorated significantly. I would feel comfortable in employing the 1 x PLT that solely trained on delivery of FA Fires anywhere within the JAD-Iraq. The remainder of the BN would be incapable of doing so.											

Table E-3

Raw Survey Results (4 of 4)

What is your current duty position?	What system is your BN equipped with?	Is your battalion DS or GS?	What percentage of your battalion's training time has been or will be spent on traditional artillery tasks vs. non-traditional tasks?	With no decrease, how much time would be required to train your battalion to 100% proficiency in traditional artillery mission essential tasks?	Of the three core FA LT duty positions (FSO, FDO and XO/Plng PL), what percentage of your junior officers have (or will have) more than 6 months of experience in more than one duty position prior to being promoted to Captain?	What percentage of your junior officers will be released from active duty in lieu of attending a Captain's Career Course?	Of your current battery commanders, what percentage have two traditional XO/Plng PL?	When was your most recent Mission Readiness Exercise? Where - CMTL/DMTC, NTC, JRTC, Homestead?	With respect to field artillery training, recent CTC rotations in this most experienced before May 2007 (if you do not know leave blank)	How would you compare the proficiency of your battalion today to execute traditional FA tasks to your unit before May 2007?
BN Cdr	M198	GS	50%	30%	10%	0.4		Homestead	Different focus: focused on non-traditional	Significantly behind on traditional tasks, but more adaptable and agile
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS	98%	0%	60%	0.2				less prepared
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS	90%	10%	20%	0.5		12/07/2010		Poor
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS	25%	60%	20%	0.2		None	None	Significantly decreased
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS	100% Arty tasks	8 promotion	20%	0.4		unknown	no CTC rotations for Bn	We will be just as well trained, if not better, by May 2010
BN Cdr	M270 series	GS	10%	3%	20%	0.2		Homestead	No focus on HIC	All leaders from section chief to BN cdr need to re-educate themselves. The difficult thing is we have lost so many leaders the ones we do have have never work on the system.
BN Cdr	M777	GS	75%	10%	10%	1		OCT DS / Homestead	N/A	At howitzer section level, no change. PLT FDCs that have deployed, no change. Dwell issues cause many instances of CPL and SGT (very young in physical age) howitzer and FDC Section Chiefs that were not common pre-2003 but these leaders are very proficient in their technical duties but lack leadership and gunline experience that was very common years ago among section chiefs. Bn FDC and Bn Staff today are not nearly as trained or proficient as an FA staff and FDC pre-2003. We have not executed "battalion" operations in years.
BN Cdr	Paladin	GS	60% on traditional artillery tasks	30%	50%	0.75		NA	NA	We are completely untrained at the battalion level. We have qualified sections but struggle at the Platoon Level.
BN Cdr	Paladin	DS	70%	12%		0		NTC/September		Upon conversion to DMETL, we parked the howitzers and except for one "hot" platoon never went back to FA specific tasks.
BN Cdr	Paladin	DS	30%	60%	15%	0.5		NTC, Jan 09	COIN focused, but we did complete Table XII prior to arrival, fired Excalibur, and performed counterfire missions across the BCT AO. Still, bulk of our operations were as a maneuver task force.	There is no comparison. Prior to our short CMETL training, none of the battery commanders had ever fired a round. More than half of the section chiefs had no artillery experience. The FDCs required complete reset and retraining, beginning with fire direction fundamentals. The staff was severely untrained, and the modular formation that took service battery and replaced it with an FSC from the BSB hampered artillery-related maintenance and resupply operations.
BN Cdr	Paladin	DS	20%	60%	25%	0.5		pending - April 10		Poor and severely degraded - SR leaders have the majority of the experience w/regards to traditional FA tasks (massing, counter-fire, special munitions/sits)
BN Cdr	M777	DS	100% so far, is changing now.	All of the ones arriving now - none prior to June 2009	8%	0.5		NTC - Fall 2007, Next one is NTC - Spring 2010	Was not in command	Better. We training CMETL (now called FSO) hard for about 3 months, culminating in a 2-week FTX on the big island where we fired over 2000 rounds of 155mm. We were able to qualify all guns to platoon level.

Table E-4

Appendix F: Bibliography

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